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ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON, )
)

Defendant-Appellant.

)

IDAHO

NO. 411

APPELLANT'S BRI
IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REVIEW

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Robert Stevenson asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of the
Idaho Court of Appeals, 2014 Opinion No. 96 (Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2014) (hereinafter,
Opinion). He submits that the Opinion, which affirmed the order denying his motion for
credit for time served by holding that credit is only appropriate for periods when the
defendant is imprisoned, misreads the relevant statutes.

The Court of Appeals'

conclusion fails to give effect to the common use definition of all the terms in the

1

d

this

In 2008, Mr. Stevenson was charged with three counts of aggravated assault, as
well

a sentencing enhancement for use of a deadly
had used a knife in an
his

(R., pp.27-28.)
himself from

(L.B.),

as they approached him in an
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),

victims admitted

they were trying to take Mr. Stevenson's backpack, but asserted they did so in an effort
to recover some of L.B.'s property, which they said Mr. Stevenson had taken.

(PSI,

p.81.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Stevenson pied guilty to one of the charges of
aggravated assault and the weapon enhancement. (R., pp.56-57.) The State agreed to
dismiss the remaining charges and recommend a unified sentence of eight years, with
two years fixed, to be suspended for a period of probation, which would include local jail
time as a condition of probation.

(R., pp.56-60.)

1

The district court followed that

PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF file
"STEVENSON psi." Included in this file are the PSI report and all the documents
attached thereto (police reports, addendum from rider staff, etc.).

2

of

some

included

of 210

jail,

Fourth, Fifth,

and Sixth Amendment rights, restrictions on Mr. Stevenson's use of his time and
money, and restrictions on his ability to move

(R., pp.76-78.) Mr. Stevenson

was also advised that credit would not be awarded for the time spent on probation.
(R.,
Mr.

While his performance during that
was

in

of probation was not perfect,

comply with

1

the

his probation

filed a

probation violation,

violations occurring between 2010 and 201

(R., pp.106-08.) Mr. Stevenson ultimately

admitted to being charged with three new misdemeanor offenses and drinking alcohol
on three different occasions. (See R., pp.107-08, 141.) A mental health evaluation was
performed following those admissions and Mr. Stevenson was diagnosed as suffering
from major depressive disorder and anxiety disorder (not otherwise specified).
p.27.)

(PSI,

Considering this information, both his probation officer and the presentence

investigator recommended that the district court retain jurisdiction. (PSI, p.6; R., p.112.)
The district court followed that recommendation. (R., pp.141-46.)
Unfortunately, Mr. Stevenson did not perform well during that period of retained
jurisdiction, as there were several incidents which the staff indicated could have
constituted formal disciplinary reports.

(PSI, p.31.)

3

However, no formal disciplinary

1.)

I,

two pro se

pursuant

l.C

The first, filed pursuant to Rule 35(b ), requested that the district

(hereinafter, Rule

court reconsider his sentence and grant leniency. (R., pp.163-66.) The district court
denied that motion, pointing to Mr. Stevenson's failures during his periods of probation
and retained jurisdiction, which it decided demonstrated that the
still appropriate.

was

, pp.1
pursuant
had

his

and
on probation

credit
complying with

terms thereof. (R., pp.177-78.) He contended that credit was appropriate because he
was subject to numerous restrictive conditions, and thus, his probation was more akin to
incarceration.

(R., pp.177-78.)

The district court denied that motion based on

precedent which held that probationers are not entitled to credit for the time served on
probation. (R., p.190.)
Mr. Stevenson filed separate, timely notices of appeal from each of the district
court's decisions on his Rule 35 motions. (R., pp.195-201.) On appeal, he requested
that transcripts of five hearings be prepared and augmented into the appellate record.

2

2

Specifically, he requested the transcripts from the change of plea hearing held on
March 2, 2009, the sentencing hearing held on April 10, 2009, the admit/deny hearing
held on March 30, 2012, the dispositional hearing held on May 18, 2012, and the rider
review hearing held on September 12, 2012. However, he did not pursue his requests
for the transcripts of the change of plea or admit/deny hearings on appeal.

4

in

in denying

had

on probation

in

the

adhering to the terms thereof; (2) whether this

erred in denying his motion to augment the record 3 ; and (3) whether the
abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a reduction of his sentence. On the
he

plain language of I

§1

revealed that

d

the

was on

adhering

§

provides, as

ru

it is

unless and until one of the statutory exceptions to that rule apply.

However, he

court

by denying
He
against

1

once

is

and

contended that, by the plain language of the statutes, those exceptions only apply when
the person is "temporarily" released from prison and is "at large" during that release. As
a person on probation adhering to the terms thereof is not temporarily released or at
large, he contended those exceptions did not apply in his case.
In regard to the credit issue, the Court of Appeals held that, under its reading of
the plain language of the credit statutes, only the periods of time the defendant was
imprisoned were properly awarded as credit. (Opinion, pp.3-4.) Since Mr. Stevenson
was not incarcerated during the time for which he was claiming credit, the Court of

3

While the appeal was proceeding, this Court issued its opinion in State v. Easley, 156
Idaho 214, 218-20 (2014), which addressed several of the issues Mr. Stevenson raised
in regard to his challenge on the motion to augment the record.

5

of
on
(Opinion,
of

to
decision in
It

Idaho 61

found no

(Opinion,

6

)

in denying the
r.

a timely petition

7

Idaho
only "when there are special

important reasons" for doing so but, ultimately,

decision of whether to grant a given petition lies within the sound discretion
Su pre me Court. I.A. R. 11 B(b ). This
Rule 11 B(b) provides some

the

of discretion is not completely unfettered.

which

be considered in evaluating

Court
from the
Supreme Court;
Whether

petition

decision is inconsistent
Court or
United

3)

Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own
prior decisions;

4)

Whether the Court of Appeals' actions are so unusual as to call for
the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority;

I.AR. 118(b). In this case, Mr. Stevenson contends that there are special and important

reasons for review to be granted.

For example, the Court of Appeals' analysis is in

contravention of Idaho Supreme Court and Court of Appeals precedent in regard to the
proper interpretation of statutes, as it fails to give effect to the plain language in the
credit statutes. I.AR. 118(b)(2)-(3). It also creates discord between the credit statutes

8

11

Mr.

contends that

it does not give

to the plain

two statutes
Code § 18-309

Opinion is
in the relevant

§

issue in this case are
the courts in the

The
Idaho

1

of the "term of imprisonment"

judgment
incarceration
judgment was
remainder of
term commences
pronouncement
and if thereafter, during such term, the defendant by any legal means is
temporarily released from such imprisonment and subsequently returned
thereto, the time during which he was at large must not be computed as
part of such term.
l.C. §18-309.

This statute addresses credit awards in both pre-judgment and post-

judgment contexts. Mr. Stevenson's claim is for credit for time served post-judgment.
4

If this Court grants the petition for review, it should grant review as to all issues raised
in the original briefing. In that case, Mr. Stevenson contends he should be granted relief
on those issues for the reasons stated in his Appellant's and Reply Briefs, which are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
5
The district court only considered l.C. § 18-309. (R., pp.189-90.) However, as the
Court of Appeals pointed out, l.C. § 19-2603 is "the more applicable statute in this
instance" because Mr. Stevenson is claiming credit in regard to a period of probation.
(See Opinion, p.3 n.1.) Nevertheless, as both statues use similar language in their
provisions regarding credit awards, that distinction is not relevant to the analysis of this
issue on appeal. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 145 Idaho 866, 870 (Ct. App. 2008)
(reversing the district court's grant of credit for time served for a period of probation
based on the language in l.C. § 18-309). Neither statute prevents awards of credit for
the time the probationer is adhering to the terms of his probation.

9

n

I.

1

§ 1
was
until
doing so.

it

§ 18-309. Therefore, the remainder

Stevenson's

imprisonment" commenced on April 10, 2009, which was the
pronounced by
in I.

§ 18-309,
of

There are a

his

district court. 6 (R., pp.68-69.) Thus, under
the
should

was

general rule

of

forth

which
part of

exceptions

of

will

of

from

accruing credit against his sentence after his sentence has been pronounced. The first
exception is in l.C. § 18-309 itself: if, after the remainder of the term of imprisonment
commences, "the defendant by any legal means is temporarily released from such
imprisonment and subsequently returned thereto, the time during which he was at large
must not be computed as part of such term." l.C. § 18-309. However, as release on
probation is not a "temporary" release, nor is the probationer who is adhering to the
terms of his probation "at large" during that time he is adhering to the terms of his

6

In fact, while the execution of Mr. Stevenson's pronounced sentence was ordered
suspended for a period of probation, Mr. Stevenson was not immediately released from
custody. He was held until he obtained "written proof of living accommodations for
clean/sober housing ... [he] can be released upon submission [of that documentation]."
(R., p.69.) Under the general rule from l.C. §18-309, Mr. Stevenson would be entitled to
credit for the time he was in custody before being released to probation because he
began serving his term of imprisonment before he was actually released to probation.

10

is

from I

A

in

§1

' it

at
of

term of

creates

for

suspended

[which] shall

" l.C. § 1

counted as a

that

exception in l.C. § 18-309, does not apply to the probationer who is adhering to the
terms of probation because that probationer is not "at large."
However, the Court of Appeals determined that the critical language in the credit
statutes, particularly l.C. § 18-309, is the use of the terms "imprisonment" and
"incarceration," and so, held that a defendant is only entitled to credit for time he was
imprisoned or incarcerated. (Opinion, pp.3-4.) That interpretation does not give effect
to the plain language of the other terms in the statutes (such as "at large"), and creates
discord with other, related statutes, and, as such, is inconsistent with precedent.
Therefore, this Court should grant review.

7

7

For these same reasons, Mr. Stevenson also contends that previous decisions which
have held that credit for time served on probation is not appropriate, see, e.g.,
State v. Banks, 121 Idaho 608, 610 (1992); State v. Buys, 129 Idaho 122, 126 (Ct. App.

11

a

on

in 1.C. § 1

is
AND

821 (2007).

phrase "by any legal means is temporarily

from incarceration" is ordinarily understood to mean "by legal means is
for a time only from such incarceration."
The determination of
on

was

should

time the relevant

v.

Cf

155 Idaho

are

to

or

d

Wattenbarger v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho 308, 315 (2010) (holding that,
when a term in a contract is unclear, the courts consider "the meaning intended by the
parties at the time of contracting, not at some future time").
question is:

Thus, the appropriate

at the moment of release, was the release temporary?

The answer in

regard to a release on probation is "no," because there is no associated requirement
that the defendant ever return to prison. Therefore, the release was not temporary; it
was designed to release the probationer from incarceration permanently.

See, e.g.,

l.C. § 19-2604(1 ).

1996); Taylor v. State, 145 Idaho 866, 869-70 (Ct. App. 2008), are manifestly wrong and
should be overruled to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law, since those previous
decisions also do not give effect to the plain language of the credit statutes.
State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 660 (2000). At any rate, "[t]he interpretation of a
statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review." State v. Doe,
140 Idaho 271, 274 (2004).

12

if

the

or,

to

to the

defendant served in a penal facility prior to the suspension of his
may then be treated as a misdemeanor.

Id.

of which option the

court opts to use, the defendant is free to leave custody and is not required

id.

again before doing so.

a term of probation
or a

as a

from

limited time only.
conclusion

is

hor•f'll-Yl

grant of a furlough to an inmate.

to

Furloughs are a legal means which permit an

incarcerated person to be released from that incarceration so he might maintain regular
employment, schooling, and the like while he serves his sentence.

l.C. § 20-242(1 ).

However, unlike the probationer, the furloughed inmate must return and continue to be
incarcerated during the time he is not participating in the activity underlying his furlough.
l.C. §§ 20-242(3), 20-614(3). As a result of the requirement that the furloughed inmate
return to the place of his incarceration, the furlough release is "for a limited time only"

(i.e., the hours allotted for the employment or schooling), and thus, that release is

13

n8

is

in

Idaho

u
terminate that period of
process protections.

Id.

such,

, it must provide the defendant

certain due

This makes probation distinctly different from temporary

like furloughs, since
time by the Department

l.C. §

(1

privilege of temporary release may

revoked at any

without providing due

Therefore,

on probation

a

liberty

probationer

is

not
As probationary release is not temporary, the period during which the defendant
is on probation does not fall within the conditional scenario under which l.C. § 18-309
would stop counting credit post-judgment.

Therefore, under a proper reading of the

statute, l.C. § 18-309 does not allow the denial of credit for the period when
Mr. Stevenson was on probation adhering to the terms thereof.

8

While furlough may constitute a temporary release, that release does not trigger the
exception in I.C. § 18-309, such that a furloughed inmate could not receive credit for the
time he is on furlough. As will be discussed in depth in Section 2, infra, a furloughed
inmate who is adhering the to the conditions of his furlough is not "at large," and so, the
second condition needed to deny that inmate credit under l.C. §18-309 would not be
present.

14

l.C.

1

when

1

probationer is not "at large" during a
district court to deny credit for that
The Court of Appeals held

is

"

period of time, neither

9

if

allows the

of time.
any person who is released from incarceration is

for purposes of the

(Opinion,

(citing

v.

1995).)

1
term

with

such, is

with

review.
The courts are required to

and give effect to the Legislature's choice of

terms. See Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 895-96
(2011 ). "[T]his Court assumes that the [L]egislature meant what is clearly stated in the
statute." State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462 (1999). Additionally, where unique terms
and phrases, such as "at large," have developed specific definitions, the Legislature is
presumed to have full knowledge of that specific definition. See Robison

v. Bateman-

Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 212 (2003) (discussing a situation where jurisprudence
expanded the definition of the term in question beyond a common-usage definition for

9

Idaho Code § 18-309 provides that only "the time during which he was at large must
not be computed as part of such term [of imprisonment]." l.C. § 18-309 (emphasis
added). Similarly, l.C. § 19-2603 provides: "[T]he time such person shall have been at
large under such suspended sentence shall not be counted as a part of the term of his
sentence." l.C. § 19-2603 (emphasis added).

15

is

(3d

to use

term "at

not to use

terms, such as "released on probation" or

from incarceration." For example,

had the Legislature intended to deprive a

of credit for the entire period during

which he was released on probation, it could

written l.C. §19-2603 as follows: "the

time such

not be counted

shall have

" In

a
governs, in

that in !

§

credit in

a

§

the terms

who

"must serve out

the sentence, and the time during which such prisoner was out on parole shall not be
deemed part thereof, unless the commission, in its discretion, shall determine
otherwise." l.C. § 20-228 (emphasis added). By not drafting l.C. §§ 18-309 and 192603 in the same way as l.C. § 20-228, the Legislature demonstrated that the term "at
large" does not equate to the whole term of probation or release from incarceration.
Therefore, the Opinion, which effectively substitutes new terms for the terms actually
used by the Legislature, is erroneous.
The meaning of this different, narrower phrase - "at large" - is best understood
by referring to the illustrative definition of the term, which reads: "<the suspect is still at
large>." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 52.

This example refers to a situation where the

person is not in custody, but rather, is evading capture and at a location unknown to

16

In

1

should [not]
"

In
of credit

rd his

re

similar

deny the award for three days,

that [the defendant] was at large following his

G'"'''L"J'G"

171, 172 n.2 (Ct. App. 2006) (emphasis added).
broadly apply

Fullmer v. Collard, 143 Idaho

such, the term "at large" does not

all situations where the
he is

In the

into account the three days

, but rather, only to

in custody and his

of probation,
. The

Court

long recognized

that, "by virtue of their status alone, probationers do not enjoy the absolute liberty to
which every citizen is entitled, justifying the impos[ition] [of] reasonable conditions that
deprive

the

offender

of

some

freedoms

enjoyed

by

law-abiding

citizens."

Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848-49 (2006) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted). It has also recognized that probation is like incarceration, in that it is a
punishment imposed by the justice system, and like other forms of punishment, restricts
the person's freedoms.

United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001).

As a

result, probationers who have not absconded supervision, by definition, are not free,
unrestrained, or not under control, and thus, do not fall under the plain, ordinary
definition of the term "at large."

17

narrow u

rt of Appeals

18-309 and 1
controlling

in

it for time

is

are duty-bound, when construing

since

scheme whenever possible.

and reconcile the

Dept. of

and

v. Housel, 140 Idaho 96, 104 (2004); State v. Gamino, 148 Idaho 827,

(Ct. App. 2010).
For example, an

who is

a furlough is temporarily

by

if

large" is

from
as

,"the furloughed inmate would not
during the

he is on furlough

he would

during

that time. See l.C. § 18-309 ("if thereafter, during such term, the defendant by any legal
means is temporarily released from such imprisonment and subsequently returned
thereto, the time during which he was at large [read: released] must not be computed as
part of such term").

Such a result is directly contrary to the purpose of the furlough

statute, which was enacted to provide an incarcerated person the opportunity to serve
his sentence (i.e., get credit against his sentence) while simultaneously being
released from incarceration in order to continue his employment or education.

See

l.C. § 20-242(1 )-(2). The Court of Appeals' reading of l.C. § 18-309 - that credit is only
properly awarded for time spent while incarcerated - prevents that from being a
possibility.

However, if "at large" is given its proper, narrow definition, then

I .C. §§ 18 309 and 20-242 may be read harmoniously, because if the furloughed inmate

18

rn

puts I
conflict.

the Court

interpretation, I.

in

§18-309

credit

not" be given for any period of post-judgment time that the defendant is not
incarcerated.

10

That makes l.C. § 18-309 diametrically opposed to I

allows the parole board, in
defendant is not
of

would allow

the probationer

§ 20-228, which

discretion, to grant credit for post-judgment time that the
is released on

narrower reading

statutes

of

supervision, as

board chooses to exercise its discretion).

the

Therefore, since reading "at large" in the

broad manner the Court of Appeals did creates discord within the statutory scheme and
a harmonizing interpretation is possible, the discordant interpretation should be
rejected. See Housel, 140 Idaho at 104; Gamino, 148 Idaho at 829.
The second rationale for the narrower interpretation of the term "at large" is
related to the first, since it also arises from the fact that the Legislature has, for the last
sixteen years, provided that parolees are able to receive credit for the time during which
they are released from incarceration pursuant to the terms of their parole.

l.C. § 20-

228; 1998 Idaho Session Laws, ch. 327, § 2, p.1057 (amending the statute to allow for
10

The use of the term "must" means the statutory provision is mandatory; the courts
have no discretion to ignore its directive. See, e.g., Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 848
(1995) (explaining the difference between mandatory and permissive language in
statutory provisions).
19

The incongruity of maintaining such a distinction was criticized by Judge
soon
now

the

made

for time

to

how much sense
[sic]

it for

in the parole

while

it

"If a
spent on

to

give a

as a condition of

probation?" State v. Jakoski, 132 Idaho 67, 69 (Ct. App. 1998) (Schwartzman, Judge,
specially concurring) (emphasis in original). While Judge Schwartzman was particularly
focused on the denial of credit for the time the probationer served in a county jail as a
condition of probation, his criticism is applicable beyond that particular scenario: it is
nonsensical and improper to allow credit for parolees who adhere to the terms of their
parole, but not credit probationers who adhere to the terms of their probation (which
11

Of particular note in this comparison is the fact that l.C. § 20-228 provides "[f]rom and
after the issuance of the warrant and suspension of the parole of any convicted person
and until arrest, the parolee shall be considered a fugitive from justice." l.C. § 20-228.
This corresponds with the prohibition against the award of credit for time that the
defendant is "at large" (i.e., a fugitive). See l.C. §§ 18-309, 19-2603; BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, 52.
Despite the "fugitive from justice" provision, l.C. § 20-228
immediately goes on to provide that the parole commission may grant credit for the time
which the parolee served on parole. I.C. § 20-228. Therefore, a similar interpretation of
I.C. §§ 18-309 and 19-2603 is also reasonable.

20

in

as a whole.

was not

It is clear that

conditions thereof since he was not

adhering to the terms
to at least

was

(R., pp.76-78.) One of
, pp.76-77.)

of probation
or unrestrained. He

different "special conditions"

was on probation.

was that he serve 210

Ada County Jail. 12

He was controlled, in that he was

(R.,

to maintain full-time

)
probation

any
77-78.)

during

His right to privacy was

to

his

Fourth Amendment constitutional rights regarding searches of his person and property.
(R., p.77.)

He was also required to waive his Fifth Amendment right against self

incrimination, as he was required to truthfully answer all questions of his probation
officer related to the terms of his probation. (R., p.77.) He was even required to waive
his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation at any subsequent hearing in regard to his
probation. (R., p.77.)

12

The district court awarded Mr. Stevenson credit against the period of discretionary
time for 160 days previously served, leaving him with fifty days that he could be required
to serve. (R., p.76.) Mr. Stevenson was also not immediately released to probation,
though his motion for early release in that regard was granted. (R., pp.69, 89.)
Therefore, the fact that Mr. Stevenson was still actually physically confined in a penal
facility for part of the term of his probation invokes Judge Schwartzman's specific
criticism and demonstrates why the Opinion is wrong. See Jakoski, 132 Idaho at 67-69.

21

in

He was
Idaho,

of

his absence from the state was approved by his probation officer. (R., p.78.) Thus,
given these numerous restraints on Mr. Stevenson, it cannot be said that he was "free,
unrestrained, or not under control," and therefore, it cannot be said that he was
during his period of probation.
Mr.
on

to

no

of violation filed

on

April 24, 2009, and the probable cause form filed on March

201

based on an

agent's warrant).) During that time, Mr. Stevenson lived under those restrictions to his
rights and restraints to his freedom. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 119. As such, he was not
free, unrestrained, or not under control due to the terms of his probation. This is true
even though the report of violation that was filed in 2012 indicates he was not fully
successful at all times during that three-year period.

(See R., pp.106-08.)

None of

those alleged violations are based on his absconding from supervision. 13

13

(See

Mr. Stevenson does recognize that one of the allegations that he admitted was that
he had committed the crime of Failure to Appear. (R., p.107.) However, that allegation
does not indicate that he had absconded supervision or that his probation officer did not
know where he was; rather, it only indicates that he missed a court appearance. (See
R., pp.107, 110.) And even if that is sufficient to determine he was "at large," the record
demonstrates that he would have been at large for a total of twenty-one days, as he

22

Thus,
scenario in

of
probationer may

denied credit

is if he

supervision. Therefore, giving all the terms
properly interpreted to read, "the

" I

from

common meanings, the statutes are
person shall have been
shall not

suspended

under

a

as

large [read:
term of

§ 1
during which he

of the

and

numerous

and

on his

freedom was improper.

C.

The Statute Is, At Least, Ambiguous, And The Rule Of Lenity Requires That
Ambiguity Be Resolved In Mr. Stevenson's Favor
To the extent that there are multiple, rational interpretations of the terms in the

credit statutes, specifically in regard to the terms "at large" and "temporarily released,"
the statutes are, at least, ambiguous as to whether credit should be given for time spent
in the custody of the Department of Correction adhering to all the restrictive terms of
probation. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 895-96. In such an instance, the rule of lenity
requires the ambiguity to be resolved in Mr. Stevenson's favor.
State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103 (2007).

See, e.g.,

In this case, that would mean that

turned himself into authorities on September 20, 2011. (R., p.110.) Thus, even in that
case, the credit statutes would only disallow credit for those twenty-one days.
23

in

rt
Gou rt

r.
for time

his motion

and

it

rc,\/Or'0

this case

lation

of credit.
He

access to the

this
his

as it

transcripts

to
appropriate, or alternatively, remand the case for a reduction

of sentence pursuant to l.C.R. 35.
DATED this 161h day of December, 2014.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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